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Among theorists of all kinds, those generally engaged at some level of their work in
a dialectical enterprise, and certainly in argumentation theory, much argument
concerns, is about or directed toward, other arguments. Arguments about arguments,
meta-arguments, including all of the rational inferential underpinnings of
argumentation theory, are in several ways and for several reasons worth
distinguishing from arguments about things other than arguments, such as the
causes of WWI or the periodicity of the tides.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro in this new book offers an interesting contribution to
argumentation theory, and in particular to the study of meta-arguments about the
logic and critical evaluation of arguments, in both a general sense as argumentation
theory, and in specific applications. One of Finocchiaro’s preferred subjects of
specific application of his approach to meta-argumentation theory is in understand-
ing the fine details of Galileo’s arguments and meta-arguments, especially in
Galileo’s frequently meta-argumentive (1632) Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief
World Systems, Ptolemaic and Copernican. Finocchiaro, in addition to being a
recognized meta-argumentation theorist, is a respected Galileo and history of early
physics scholar. It is therefore unsurprising to find in the present book that he
sometimes weaves together the study of Galileo with argumentation theory, to the
philosophical enrichment of both strands, in considering the informal logical
properties and rhetorical force of Galileo’s arguments and meta-arguments in
historical context. Along with selected showcase analyses of meta-argumentation in
Galileo, Finocchiaro chooses examples of meta-argumentation for detailed critical
evaluation to illustrate the concept and methods of meta-argumentation from among
a wide selection of interesting applications in philosophy, science, and practical
reasoning broadly conceived.
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There is accordingly much more in Finocchiaro’s Meta-argumentation than
revisiting overlapping main themes that have previously occupied his attention. The
present book has a more concentrated focus on the concept of meta-argumentation
than is otherwise suggested by the titles of his previous (1980) book, Galileo on the
Art of Reasoning: Rhetorical Foundations of Logic and Scientific Method, and his
(2005) collection, Arguments About Arguments: Systematic, Critical, and Historical
Essays in Logical Theory. Among other things, Finocchario now more explicitly
energetically promotes the concept of meta-argument as an interesting subject area
in its own right for argumentation research. Part of Finocchario’s new project seems
intended to lead argumentation theory toward a more acute awareness and greater
appreciation of the occasions on which arguments are about other arguments, rather
than more directly about whatever non-argument ground-level objects that some of
the arguments in any meta-argumentation chain finally intend.
Finocchiaro’s book is divided into three main parts. Following Acknowledg-
ments and an Introduction: A special class of arguments, there begins Part I: The
Meta-Argumentation Approach, contains three chapters. Chapter 1: Methodological
Considerations: Toulmin’s Applied Logic. Chapter 2: Elementary Principles of
Interpretation and Evaluation. Chapter 3: Basic Types of Meta-Argumentation. Part
II: Theoretical Meta-Arguments, includes Chapter 4: Dialectical Definitions of
Argument. Chapter 5: The Hyper-Dialectical Definition of Argument. Chapter 6:
Common Methods of Argument Criticism. Chapter 7: Deep Disagreements, Fierce
Standoffs, Etc. Chapter 8: Conductive Arguments, Pro-and-Con Reasoning, Etc.
Chapter 9: Self-Referential Arguments. Part III: Famous Meta-Arguments, closes
the main part of the book with Chapter 10: Mill on Liberty of Argument.
Chapter 11: Mill on Women’s Liberation. Chapter 12: Hume on Intelligent Design.
Chapter 13: Galileo on the Motion of the Earth. The book ends with a Conclusion:
Argumentation Theory as Meta-Argumentation, Bibliography, and Index. The book
provides an extended thematic, conceptual and methodological overview, followed
by a more thorough elaboration of a choice of subtopics in meta-argumentation
theory, and finally a series of four historical applications to meta-arguments by John
Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Galileo.
Finocchario’s exposition not only makes a strong case for the importance of
recognizing and being prepared argumentively to work sometimes with and
sometimes against meta-arguments, but further illustrates the importance of meta-
argumentation in the annals of philosophical exchange in these venerable cherry-
picked texts from Renaissance science through late middle nineteenth century social
philosophy. The authors, whether they knew it or not, were engaged in meta-
arguments, and hence in meta-argumentation governed by principles of meta-
argumentation theory. Finocchario explains his purpose, building on argumentation
theory precedents of Stephen Toulmins, near the end of Chapter 1:
…theorizing about argumentation is best conceived and practiced as arguing
about argumentation. Such meta-argumentation should also strive to be
pragmatic, comparative, empirical, historical, and naturalist, as Toulmin
recommends in general. I plan to satisfy these requirements while studying a
special class of arguments, namely arguments about arguments, i.e., meta-
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arguments. Now, there happen to be two domains or contexts that provide
excellent material that will be examined in the course of this work. One is
arguments advanced by logicians and argumentation theorists to justify their
theories and theoretical claims; these might be called theoretical meta-
arguments. The other is arguments from the history of thought which for
various reasons have acquired classic status; these might be called famous
meta-arguments. (16–17)
There are so many worthwhile reflections on the nature of argument and meta-
argument in Finocchario’s study that it is impossible to do them all justice or even to
convey a proper sense of the book’s full scope and comprehension. For anyone
interested in the recent history of argumentation theory and major players,
internationally, but radiating primarily from Amsterdam and several locations in
Canada, Finocchiaro’s book provides an invaluable statement and assessment of
many of the current positions in pragma-dialecticism and the informal logic critical
reasoning movement in a wide variety of healthy contemporary splinterings.
We can check on the progress of several important trends in argumentation
theory in Finocchiaro’s pages, including the work of Frans van Eemeren and the
International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), Ralph Johnson, J.
Anthony Blair, John Woods, Toulmin again, Michael Scriven, and Henry W.
Johnstone, Jr., among others too numerous to mention, some of them also directly or
indirectly associated with the Canadian Society for the Study of Argumentation
(CSSA). Here we find in-depth discussions of important traditional and relatively
new topics in argumentation theory, relevant to Finocchiaro’s focus on meta-
argumentation, such as deep disagreements. The deepest of these Woods calls
‘Force 5’, by analogy with the hurricane rating system. Finocchiaro himself prefers
to describe them as ‘fierce standoffs’, where dialectical opponents cannot seem to
find any common ground of jointly accepted propositions as a starting place from
which to pursue constructive argument. The standoffs need not be fierce in the usual
sense, however; and hurricanes are rather more one-sided power events than the
stalemate that arises when opponents cannot agree on the most fundamental things.
For these reasons, I personally prefer to speak less colorfully of argumentatively
irresolvable fundamental oppositions, which I consider as the inferential equivalent
of and for the same reasons precisely as philosophically instructive as a Kantian
antinomy.
Conductive arguments, where several considerations vie against one another for
final approval of a conclusion over its competitors, especially in deference to its
negation, are examined in detail by Finocchiaro, primarily in the writings of other
contemporaries on this recent development in argumentation theory. Finocchiaro’s
sifting through the literature on conductive argument has notably raised for me the
interesting and as yet unanswered question as to whether conductive argument is a
species of abductive argument, much as I have often wondered whether abductive
reasoning is not ultimately inductive, and inductive inference, as Wilfrid sellers
provocatively argued, a species of deductive reasoning involving probability values
and the theorems of an appropriately chosen probability calculus. This is nothing
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less than the question of the unity or irreducible plurality of the model of correct
reasoning, formally or informally considered.
I thought that the topic of Finocchiaro’s Chapter 9 should have been much more
prominent and its content more thoroughly developed in a general discussion of
meta-argumentation. If meta-argumentation concerns arguments about arguments,
then the question is unavoidable whether some arguments can be about themselves.
Moreover, self-reference and self-application within argument structures pose
interesting problems concerning the logical integrity of theories based on or about
arguments, again, regardless of whether or not the theories and concept of logical
integrity are symbolically formalized or mathematicized or informally understood.
Finocchiaro chooses not to enter into these subjects in the chapter whose title
indicates more direct dealing with what look to be advertised exactly these logical
challenges of self-referential arguments. There are classic paradoxes discussed also
in the literature that should undoubtedly be considered meta-argumentational, just
as the liar paradox poses a riddle for a general truth-based propositional semantics.
Finocchiaro under the heading of self-referential argument might have mentioned
and offered his take on the Pseudo-Scotus paradox: This argument is valid; therefore
this argument is invalid. Which is valid if and only if it is invalid. Or with respect to
a strengthened Soundness paradox, stating: This argument is unsound (inclusively
either invalid or containing at least one false assumption), therefore this argument is
unsound. Which is surely meta-argumentational, and appears to unhorse the naı¨ve
assumption that an argument is either sound or unsound, since it turns out to be
sound if and only if it is unsound.
There are questions I do not find adequately addressed in Finocchiaro’s book.
One concerns the transitivity or intransitivity, wide or narrow scope of intentionality
in semantic reference. The distinction is not an accessory, but crucial, I would think,
for Finocchiaro’s purposes, because it governs the ‘aboutness’ criterion by which
meta-arguments and meta-argumentation are supposed to be distinguished from
non-meta-arguments and argumentation. Explaining his qualified agreement with
Toulmin’s theory of argumentation, Finocchiaro maintains:
Here, meta-arguments are meant to be contrasted to ground-level arguments,
which are arguments about topics other than arguments (such as numbers,
natural phenomena, historical events, and human actions), or arguments which
in a given context are the subject matter of meta-arguments. The methodo-
logical claim is that logical theory and argumentation theory are or ought to be
instances of meta-argumentation. (15)
Later, Finocchario adopts the aboutness criterion more officially but in almost the
same words on (34). It remains unclear to me, however, why arguments considered
as objects with a certain structure and content like other things we might make the
subject matter of arguments are not also ground-level or object-level. Some
argumentation theorists are sure to come to the table with the concept of an
argument as an abstract entity exactly like a number, or, alternatively, an ontology
for arguments that emphasizes the speech act aspect of argumentive exchange in
real pragmatic contexts, who might regard arguments especially in colloquial
expression as themselves also natural phenomena or historical events involving
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human ratiocinative and linguistic actions. If J.L. Austin makes us aware of the fact
that we can do things with words, then we should certainly be advised as well of the
potential for doing things with arguments, inferences. What, then, accounts for the
meta-level stratification in the case of arguments about arguments, but not about
numbers, natural phenomena, historical events, and human actions? Logically and
metaphysically, ontologically, how are arguments supposed to be different than
numbers and the rest, such that arguments about arguments are higher-level than
arguments about non-arguments?
There is a deeper logical and philosophical semantic dilemma here that I think
must have significant implications for Finocchiaro’s meta-argumentation project.
The question arises when we inquire whether a meta-argument M about an argument
A that is about a non-argument object O is or is not itself (M, that is) also about O. I
touch deliberately here on the thorny question in intentionality theory as to whether
intentionality is or is not wide or transitive. It is the question, highlighted among
other discussions of the difference between wide and narrow intending, by Hilary
Putnam’s famous Twin-Earth object-level referential meaning scenario. We can
easily get into trouble trying to say either that wide or narrow intentionality rules
where criteriological aboutness distinctions between arguments and meta-arguments
are sought.
Wide intentionality, first of all, does not respect the authority of first-person
phenomenological testimony as to the limits of referential intendings. If I intend
narrowly to refer to Samuel Clemens, and Samuel Clemens is identical to Mark
Twain, then I widely intend to refer to Mark Twain, even if I have never heard of his
name and would own no thoughts concerning who he is or what he may have done.
If I am on Earth, then, similarly, I may intend narrowly to refer to water where water
is H2O, and thereby widely intend to refer to H2O, even if I am living and thinking
before the advent of molecular theory or the discovery of the molecular structure of
(Earth) water by Henry Cavendish in the 1780s, and never entertained any conscious
thoughts phenomenologically accessible to me as thinker involving the concept of
H2O. If I am transported to Twin-Earth, and think the identical thought, then I may
widely intend to refer to water where this substance is XYZ, and thereby widely
intend to refer to XYZ, even though as an Earthling I may have no concept and no
prior history of contact with any such liquid stuff as molecular XYZ. The
counterintuitive reverse ordering of terms in widely intentional referring to H2O as
identical to water also deserves to be mentioned as a criticism of the wide
intentionality option for a criteriological aboutness distinction between non-meta-
and meta-arguments and -argumentation. If I intend narrowly to refer to H2O as a
particular molecular compound when I write that ‘Cavendish discovered that (Earth)
water is H2O’, then my true statement logically implies the false statement,
‘Cavendish discovered that (Earth) water is (Earth) water’. Similarly, if we write
simply, the true sentence ‘Cavendish discovered H2O’, then we must expect, on the
wide intentionality reading of the intentional relation of discovering something, also
to imply, ‘Cavendish discovered (Earth) water’, which again does not have anything
like the same ring of truth.
The issue is one of whether intentionality extends only narrowly, intensionally,
so far as to encompass what a thinking subject deliberately intends, and of which
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relevant intentions the intending subject could in principle give an account relying
on a phenomenology of referential meaning. Or whether intentionality should be
understood as going beyond the phenomenology or inner experience of intending, to
widely, extensionally, intend everything that is further referentially related to what a
thinking subject occurrently and deliberately referentially intends. As in any such
dialectical opposition, there must predictably be defenders for both sides of such a
fundamental dispute. They will be in Force 5 standoff before they know it, and we
may wish to sell tickets. If both kinds of intentionality are judged genuine
alternative forms of intending, then philosophical conversations about an argument
intending an argument, itself or another, will need to be reconsidered, as
appropriate, in terms of more explicitly distinguished narrow-aboutness and wide-
aboutness. When we make the application to a case of Putnam’s Twin-Earth thought
experiment, the conclusions Putnam draws from the description of the case in his
(1973) ‘The Meaning of ‘‘Meaning’’’ can no longer be sustained except as involving
terminological equivocations. What happens, then, when the distinction between
meta-arguments and ground-level arguments similarly depends on the claim that
meta-arguments are arguments that are about other arguments, and not about the
objects of ground-level arguments?
If aboutness is transitive, or wide as Putnam supposes, then meta-arguments are
also about topics other than arguments. They are also about the topics of the
arguments that they are about. The distinction between arguments and meta-
arguments would then be blurred right from the outset. This, in fact, is one of the
persistent obstacles to my understanding the concept of meta-argumentation in its
relation to both logic and non-meta- general argumentation theory. Finocchiaro does
not enter into these theoretical disputes, but what he says strongly indicates
commitment to a narrow sense of aboutness or a hierarchy of direct and indirect
aboutnesses, such that a meta-argument about an argument about an object can be
considered to be directly about the argument and indirectly about the object, while
the argument is exclusively directly about the object.
Clearly, there are choices for answers to be given here. What I found missing was
a better sense of Finocchiaro’s views on these kinds of questions. It is hard to see
how the problem can be avoided in the long run, if the project of investigating meta-
argumentation is to prosper, predicated in the first place on the ability criteriolog-
ically to distinguish non-meta- from meta-arguments and meta-argumentation. If we
cannot distinguish meta-arguments from other arguments, then, except at the most
intuitive and conceptually dangerous level, we can hardly proceed to develop a
theory concerning the properties and principles of meta-argumentation if we cannot
properly distinguish meta-arguments from non-meta-arguments. Taking sides on the
wide or narrow intentionality of reference in deciding which arguments are about
ground-level objects rather than other arguments is not an optional exercise for a
complete theory of meta-argumentation. What are the possibilities for Finocchiaro
to adopt instead narrow intentionality in applying the aboutness criterion to
distinguish between non-meta- and meta-arguments?
This option, unfortunately, is also burdened with serious philosophical
drawbacks. To mention only a few, we thereby make intending entirely a subjective
intensional occurrence, for which there are no accountable external objective
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extensionally expressible determinants, possibly falling, therefore, entirely outside
the field of a philosophically exact theory of argumentation or meta-argumentation.
The targeting of arguments or non-arguments by a potential meta-argument in that
case becomes a matter of what different thinkers and language users happen to
believe themselves to be intending. The result, if it is to constitute the firm
foundation for a good theory of meta-argumentation, requires further finessing and
meta–meta-argumentation, in order to make progress toward a proper aboutness
criterion for the distinction between non-meta- and meta-argument and meta-
argumentation. This is another unanswered question I now have concerning
Finocchiaro’s concept of meta-argumentation.
If, on the other hand, we give up on Finocchiaro’s and by extension Toulmin’s
aboutness criterion for a distinction between non-meta- and meta-arguments and
non-meta- and meta-argumentation theory, in light of the narrow-wide intentionality
dilemma, then we can only hope to distinguish meta-arguments from non-meta-
arguments to meta-argumentation criteriologically by referencing instead the
difference between an argument’s intending or referring directly or indirectly to
another argument or to intended objects other than arguments. It is the intuitive
difference between an argument concerning the phases of the moon or the
kinematics of a pendulum’s motion and an argument concerning an argument about
the phases of the moon or the pendulum’s oscillation. The appeal to direct versus
indirect referential meaning is a deceptively enticing strategem. It seems to agree in
the first place with referential practice in some sense and at some level. A book
referred to in a review footnote may refer directly to the Crimean War, whereas the
footnote refers only indirectly to the Crimean War via the content printed in the
book on the specified page.
The fact that there are unproblematic examples to serve as a model or metaphor
for the distinction between direct and indirect reference does not mean that the
general relation is understood clearly enough to provide guidance in the case of the
direct or only indirect reference to another argument or non-argument. An
argument’s intended object or what it is about, in trying to arrive at a good criterion
for exactly marking the difference between non-meta-arguments and meta-
arguments and meta-argumentation. We can challenge the sharp definition of any
such distinction between argument and meta-argument by posing the old chestnut
about one reasoner’s modus ponens being another reasoner’s modus tollens. If
G argues at time t1 that if God exists, then the Bible is true, to the conclusion that
because God exists therefore the Bible is true, and H, hearing or reading this,
responds by arguing at a later time t2 that if God exists, then the Bible is true, to the
conclusion that since the Bible is not true therefore God does not exist, then
intuitively H’s argument is about G’s argument, to which it may have historically
been presented as a deliberate polemical reply among its prime motivations.
Nevertheless, there appears to be nothing structural or in any other way objective
about either G’s or H’s argument that makes H’s argument a clearcut meta-
argument with G’s argument as its intended object. Given the reliance of a
distinction between argument and meta-argument in this scenario on what G and
H subjectively intend by their use of opposed modus ponens and modus tollens
inferences, we are free to suppose that H intends the modus tollens riposte to G’s
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modus ponens as an expression of a meta-argument, directed in particular toward
discrediting G’s argument by means of an argument that is meant to target another
argument, and perhaps further to highlight the circular nature of such reasoning at
least on the part of modus ponens reasoner G. It is not coincidentally a case of
precisely the sort that Henry Johnstone seems to have in mind, whereby any
argument directed against any other argument always involves a shared assumption,
not intended as a logical or rhetorical fallacy, prefigured in the roughly John Locke
and Richard Whately sense of the nonabusive ad hominem, excluded only in case of
the most desperate fundamental oppositions.
What, however, if H leads with the modus tollens inference, and G subsequently
counters with the above modus ponens? Does that mean that the G’s argument
(identical in content as previously) is then the meta-argument and H’s the ground-
level argument? Is it merely a question of who gets where with what first? What if
they issue their arguments in anticipated collision with one another at exactly the
same time? We might have to say in that case that both arguments are meta-
arguments, because one needs to be an argument of some kind, meta-arguments are
arguments, and each argument, G’s modus ponens and H’s modus tollens, seems to
be directed against the other, as in some sense an argument wielded in order to
defeat their respective counterpart logical inferences. Would not both of the
arguments, furthermore, also be about both the non-argument objects God and the
Bible, and the specified states of affairs in which God exists or fails to exist, and the
Bible is factually true or factually false, or even internally logically inconsistent
even under the most charitable interpretations? Would not both arguments also be
about the arguments with which their respective proponents are seeking to uphold
the truth of what are collectively logically incompatible propositions? The answer to
this question may also have implications for better understanding the relation
between meta-argumentation theory and non-meta- general argumentation theory.
For anyone who shares a sense of the problem, it should be interesting see how the
categories might best be explained.
Naturally, there might be many good answers in reply to these devil’s advocate
objections. Suppose, then, that someone further asks, why should we recognize a
special category of meta-arguments, if the general principles for identifying and
critically evaluating meta-arguments are exactly the same as those for object-level
arguments, in the most general sense already covered by general argumentation
theory? Why not conservatively consider the logical structure of all arguments,
including meta-arguments, as governed by a single favored deductive logic, as the
stereotypical deductivist is supposed to advocate? Or adopt and adapt a spectrum of
classical and nonclassical inferential logical formalisms, alongside or within the
most comprehensive deductive structures, as need presents, including whatever
inductive logics, and formalisms of abductive and in principle also conductive
arguments might be relevant, should these prove to be distinct categories? Or get as
informal and art versus science in the evaluation of arguments as you please, call
that logic, and ask whether or not meta-argument would not need to be subject to
logic in that comprehensive informal sense, so that to describe logic as itself only an
episode of meta-argument seems once again not to correctly picture their
interrelation. With a realistic selection of logics currently available, the right
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choice of logic for a specific analytic task can itself become a matter of dispute and
argumentation, which we should nevertheless find ourselves uncomfortable in
calling meta-logical reasoning, in a terminology for which there is already an
established usage in logical parlance. Such meta-argumentation reasoning, like
meta-logical reasoning in the sense of logical metatheory must itself presumably
involve inferences governed by, once again, disconcertingly, the right logic.
From a certain perspective, there need be no deep conflict in acknowledging logic
as ruling meta-argument and meta-argumentation theory, while meta-arguments and
meta-argumentation theory and applications rely on logic and make use of logical
concepts and methods. The same is true of any theory that arrives at or presents its
results in the form of arguments. Which is to say almost everything except for
divine revelation. Finocchiaro does not explicitly endorse such a meta–meta-
argument, or, metaphorically speaking, the enveloping of meta-argumentation
theory in logic. He seems in fact emphatically to resist any such picture, by insisting
on an equivocation between the logic circumscribed in dusty deductive logic
textbooks, and a more latitudinarian concept of logic gestured toward in only a
general vaguely specified sense, that involves all of the factors entering into
evaluating an argument’s merits. Finocchiaro explains, in a section on the Scope of
logic:
…in a sense I agree with [J. Anthony] Blair’s key thesis that logic is only a
part of the philosophical study of argument. But my inclination is to formulate
this claim by saying that formal deductive logic is only a part of logic, thus
equating logic in general with what Blair calls the philosophy of argument,
and equating his term logic with my phrase formal deductive logic. (163)
The trouble is that as a matter of fact at the present time it is hard to find any
mathematical or philosophical symbolic logicians working in the field who would
not wholeheartedly agree that formal deductive logic is ‘only part of logic’. There
lurks in this effort to demarcate the role of logic in meta-argumentation theory a
glaring false dichotomy.
The choice for logic and informal argumentation theory is not between the crusty
introductory logic systems of the last 50 years in the textbooks of common use that
Blair surveys, on the one hand, and an argumentation theory that considers ‘full-
blooded’ arguments. The choice is between an embarrassment of riches among
formal logics, including systems designed around finely-nuanced sensitivities to
other non-deductive aspects, on the one hand, and, on the other, an argumentation or
meta-argumentation theory that subordinates logic to argumentation rather than
argumentation to logic. As to non-classical and in many instances non-deductive
logics, logical structure can be modelled in more highly nuanced ways than the most
basic deductive formalisms in inductive, intensional, non monotonic, dynamic, and
modal logics, all of many kinds in many categories. If meta-argumentation is
argumentation theory that thrives on meta-argument, as Finocchiaro frequently
asserts, and if such meta-arguments as arguments are themselves subject to formal
or informal principles of correct logical reasoning, then it is hard to see how logic
could fail to subsume argumentation theory, rather than the other way around. If the
same logic, construed as generously as Finocchiaro seems to want, as the second
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dilemma horn maintains, governs argument and meta-argument with the same
subsuming logical principles, then the effect is to deprive meta-argument of any
special distinction within the general family of arguments considered by (non-meta-)
argumentation theory, especially in case the Toulmin-inspired aboutness criterion
for distinguishing non-meta- from meta-arguments and meta-argumentation cannot
be repaired.
If our task is to understand argument generally, then it may be considered an
open question whether focusing on meta-argument prepares an important piece of
the complete puzzle for future integration in the greater whole, or whether working
out the principles of meta-argumentation serves potentially instead as a distraction
from determining the most general requirements of argumentation theory, by which
meta-argument would then necessarily be properly included. The fact is that we
cannot rightly judge whether a general theory of argumentation is correct unless or
until, among other things, we can see how well the general theory serves the needs
of a correct special theory of meta-argumentation, governing the meta-arguments by
which a general argumentation theory is discovered or invented and justified. There
is no way to know except to see what happens next. Meta-argumentation theory in
Finocchiaro’s new book is essential reading as much for the questions it raises as for
the systematic treatment he offers of meta-argumentation in logic and argumen-
tation theory, for the general study of argument concerning all arguments about
arguments.
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